Instrumental Variables and Causal Mechanisms: Unpacking the Effect of Trade on Workers and Voters

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Focus: Increasing German Trade With "the East"



Focus: Increasing German Trade With "the East"



Regional Exposure to Increasing International Trade



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Trade Effect on Voting Behavior

	(5)	(6)
	+Socio IV	Standard. IV
A Trum out	0.002	0.036
a lurnout	(1.223)	(1.223)
A Vote Share CDU/CSU	-0.066	-0.016
	(-0.501)	(-0.501)
A Vote Share SPD	-0.009	-0.001
	(-0.073)	(-0.073)
A Vote Share FDP	0.119	0.022
	(1.583)	(1.583)
A Vote Share Green Party	-0.018	-0.006
A vote share Green rarty	(-0.413)	(-0.413)
A Vote Share Extreme-Right Parties	0.089**	0.044**
A vote Share Extreme right rarties	(2.055)	(2.055)
A Vote Share Far-Left Parties	-0.092	-0.024
	(-0.859)	(-0.859)
A Vote Share Other Small Parties	-0.024 (-0.564)	-0.018
		(-0.564)
FS. 7 ^{IM}	0.220***	0.220***
гэ: _{Zit} -	(7.971)	(7.971)
FS: \mathbf{Z}_{it}^{EX}	-0.202***	-0.202***
	(-7.568)	(-7.568)
F-Stat. of excluded Instruments	38.21	38.21
Period-by-region F.E.	Yes	Yes
Observations	730	730

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 - Import competition turns voters to the fringe
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- Nationalist parties gain with increasing trade exposure
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 - Nationalist parties lose with better export opportunities
- Effect is driven by low-skilled manufacturing workers
 - Do economic mechanisms explain the effect on voting?

Trade Effect on Local Labor Markets

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	IV	IV
1st Labor Market Components IMC	-0.021	-0.011
Ist Labor Warket Component: LWC ₁	(-0.679)	(-0.679)
2nd Labor Market Component: LMC ₂	-0.322***	-0.271***
	(-3.755)	(-3.755)
	-0.755***	-0.247***
A Share Manufacturing Employment	(-3.745)	(-3.745)
	-0.006***	-0.083***
A log(wean Manufacturing wage)	(-2.592)	(-2.592)
	-0.001	-0.015
A log(mean Non-manufacturing wage)	(-0.808)	(-0.808)
	-0.024***	-0.207***
A log(lotal Employment)	(-3.295)	(-3.295)
	0.110*	0.060*
A Share Unemployment	(1.694)	(1.694)
Δ log(Total Population)	-0.004*	-0.050*
	(-1.852)	(-1.852)
<u>First Stage:</u>		
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Increasing trade exposure causes labor market turmoil

 This effect has already been documented in the literature (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, 2013; Dauth, Findeisen, Suedekum, 2014; Pierce and Schott, 2016)

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We aggregate labor market adjustments

Do trade-induced labor market adjustments explain the effect on voting?

Trade Effects in Context

Trade Effect on Voting



→ Total Effect

1 SD increase in trade exposure increases right-wing vote share by 0.120 pp.

Underlying mechanism



→ Direct Effect

1 SD increase in trade exposure decreeses right-wing vote share by 0.116 pp.

→ Indirect Effect

1 SD increase in trade exposure causes labor market turmoil which increases right-wing vote share by 0.213 pp.

Conclusion

- Trade shocks causally affect voting behavior
 - Trade shocks exclusively affect right-fringe party votes
 - Right-fringe parties gain with increasing import competition
 - Effect is driven by low-skilled manufacturing workers turning to the fringe
- Labor market adjustments are the underlying cause
 - Trade causes labor market turmoil
 - Trade-induced labor market frictions radicalize voters
 - This effect is even larger than the total effect
 - Net of labor market effects, trade would have a moderating



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Left behind How to help places hurt by globalisation

"Perhaps most of all, politicians need a different mindset. For progressives, alleviating poverty has demanded welfare; for libertarians, freeing up the economy. Both have focused on people. But the complex interaction of demography, welfare and globalisation means that is insufficient. Assuaging the anger of the left-behind means realising that places matter, too."

Thank you! ——

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